We study how firms' use of in-licensing for their initial entry to a business domain can detract from the performance of subsequent autonomous endeavors in the domain. We argue that in-licensing produces high levels of causal ambiguity about factors that drive the performance achieved with the licensed product. As a result, the experience that firms gather through pre-entry licensing is likely to generate superstitious learning and overconfidence that undermine the performance of licensees' subsequent independent operations. The biases will be particularly strong in the face of contextual dissimilarity. We find consistent evidence in a study of firms that entered the global aircraft industry between 1944 and 2000. The research helps advance the understanding of the benefits and costs of markets for technology.
A growing body of research highlights the importance of markets for technology (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001; Prencipe, Davies, and Hobday, 2003) , but work to date has not considered how the decision to in-license products in a new business domain might affect licensees' subsequent ability to compete on their own and hence the success of independent products they later offer in the same domain. Some arguments suggest that experience from initial in-licensing may contribute to the success of later independent ventures (Atuahene-Gima, 1992; Zahra and Nielsen, 2002) . By contrast, this paper draws on the experiential learning literature (Levitt and March, 1988; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996; Zollo and Reuer, 2010) to argue that launching new goods and services via in-licenses generates biases that may actually inhibit the success of subsequent independent products. This study compares the performance of the first independent products of firms that enter a new business domain with or without pre-entry licensing. With independent entry without pre-entry licensing, firms establish initial operations in a domain by developing, purchasing, and bundling the resources they need to introduce their first products (Mitchell and Singh, 1992) ; with pre-entry licensing, firms enter a new domain by initially contracting to manufacture and commercialize another firm's product (Atuahene-Gima, 1992) . 1 We use data from the global aerospace industry between 1944 and 2000 to compare performance of the two entry strategies. As expected, we find lower success of independent products for firms that first undertake pre-entry licensing, particularly as contextual dissimilarity between the licensed and independent products increases. The analysis controls for the endogeneity of entry strategy choices. The research helps advance the understanding of the benefits and costs of markets for technology.
MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY AND EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING
Ongoing research has emphasized the importance of markets for technology, most commonly considering the supply side of the market. Gallini (1984) suggested that firms may sell their technology to deter entry. Teece (1986) argued that licensing becomes feasible when intellectual property regulations help potential licensors protect their property rights.
1 Hybrid modes combine internal and contractual exchanges in varying ways (Williamson, 1991; Hennart, 1993) ; we compare independent and licensing entry, while controlling for collaborative entry. Arora and Fosfuri (2003) and Fosfuri (2006) developed a model where out-licensing decisions reflect a trade-off between gaining revenues from licensing payments and losing profits due to increased competition. Only a few studies have begun to consider the demand side for technology licenses. Studies by Hobday and several co-authors highlight the role of systems integrators in combining technology acquired from suppliers (see Hobday, Davies, and Prencipe, 2005) . Other scholars argue that external sourcing requires advanced coordination ) and affects knowledge development and assembly activities differently (Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt, 2001 ). Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) found that firms tend to view internal R&D and in-licensing as complements. Nevertheless, markets for technology studies are only beginning to assess whether in-licensing offers access to new resources that contribute to later independent activities of the licensee.
Strategic management research sheds light on how in-licensing affects subsequent performance, but does not fully answer the question. Transaction cost theory argues that products that use external knowledge do not have differential performance relative to products that use in-house technologies as long as firms select sourcing modes that minimize the combination of production and transaction costs (Williamson, 1991; Leiblein, Reuer, and Dalsace, 2002) , but this conclusion focuses on the performance of given transactions rather than considering how governance choices for one set of transactions might affect the performance of later transactions. Studies of post-licensing performance offer conflicting conclusions, identifying opportunities to use in-licenses to gather resources firms need to operate in a domain (Zahra and Nielsen, 2002; Zahra, Keil, and Maula, 2005) but also highlighting constraints on subsequent independent activities because licensees commonly gain only limited access to licensors' knowledge (Mowery et al., 1996; Steensma and Corley, 2000; Anand and Khanna, 2000) . Across these studies, whether in-licensing offers sufficient access to new resources to enhance later independent activities remains an open question.
The experiential learning literature offers nuanced insights that can help answer this question, identifying both benefits and constraints of experience. Traditional arguments concerning experiential learning suggest that accumulated experience often helps firms make inferences about the effectiveness of past activities (Argote, 1999) , thereby avoiding processes that proved harmful and implementing needed actions more rapidly (Greve, 1998) .
Several studies show that production costs often decrease as firms gain experience in producing a given good (Lieberman, 1989) and that technical capabilities increase with experience (Moorman and Miner, 1997; Nerkar and Roberts, 2004) .
By contrast, other arguments about organizational experience suggest that causal ambiguity creates limits that cancel out many of the benefits of experiential learning and may even bias future activities. Causal ambiguity means that it is difficult to determine what factors produce an outcome (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990) . Levitt and March (1988) argued that firms often draw false inferences about what factors cause specific outcomes when they gather experience in situations involving high levels of causal ambiguity, thereby inhibiting effective learning and instead generating superstitious learning. In turn, they contend that superstitious learning results in overconfidence because decision makers inappropriately believe they understand the causal relationships. Overconfidence can then harm subsequent performance because it leads firms to take actions based on capabilities they do not possess and to implement activities that they cannot undertake successfully. Several scholars suggest that overconfidence can damage the performance of acquisitions (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002) , alliances (Tyler and Steensma, 1998) , international expansions (Nadolska and Barkema, 2007; Petersen, Pedersen, and Lyles, 2008) , and new product introductions (Simon and Houghton, 2003) .
Overall, the experiential learning arguments suggest an intriguing implication concerning the relative success of subsequent independent efforts by experienced and inexperienced firms. Experience that firms gather in situations involving substantial causal ambiguity produces superstitious learning and results in overconfidence, which leads them to apply lessons they believe they have learned and to take inappropriate actions that can damage future success. Conversely, decision makers in firms with no experience to draw upon have fewer biases regarding the causes of performance when they engage in a new activity and are more likely to recognize that their firm needs to develop new skills that suit the context. The inexperienced firms will spend more effort planning activities in the domain because they better recognize the technological and commercial challenges they face. Hence, inexperienced firms may actually achieve better performance than firms that have accumulated experience in contexts involving high levels of causal ambiguity. As we discuss next, the drawbacks of experience gathered in contexts with substantial causal ambiguity are relevant when analyzing how in-licensing in the markets for technology will influence the performance of subsequent internally developed initiatives.
HYPOTHESES: PRE-ENTRY LICENSING AND EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING
We argue that entry into a new business domain by in-licensing technology is particularly conducive to superstitious learning and overconfidence, constraining the performance of subsequent independent projects. A licensee carries out only a subset of all tasks necessary to introduce a new product (e.g., manufacturing and commercialization), while the licensor undertakes many of the most critical tasks (e.g., product design) (Arora et al., 2001; Fosfuri, 2006) . As a result, licensees gather experience about only a subset of required tasks. The separation of the out-licensing and in-licensing organizations inhibits the transfer of knowledge about the tasks; tacitness and organizational embeddedeness limit the ability to transfer knowledge across organizational boundaries (Kogut and Zander, 1992) , while appropriation concerns limit the incentives of the licensor to reveal underlying knowledge (Teece, 1986) . Although licensees will gain some knowledge about the licensor's activities, most learning that takes place about these activities will be indirect and partial, through observation rather than hands-on experience (Zollo and Singh, 2004) .
The idea of partial learning also arises in work by scholars such as Nelson (1998) and Pavitt (1998) that distinguishes between bodies of understanding (knowledge of technology) and bodies of practice (applications of the technology to specific products). An implication of this view is that in-licensing may help firms develop some knowledge about identifying market opportunities and manufacturing and commercializing licensed products. However, licensees do not perform the tasks related to developing the technologies embodied in the licensed products. In turn, organizational separation between licensor and licensee limits the access of licensees to the scientific and technological knowledge underlying independent operations in the domain. Hence, experience in practice with particular products may provide a first step toward acquiring such knowledge, but the in-depth understanding needed for independent new product development is likely to be incomplete ).
The partial learning from in-licensing can create causal ambiguity about factors that led to the success or failure of the licensed products. Accurate understanding of causal relationships between actions and outcomes will arise primarily for tasks the focal firm undertook, while causal drivers for tasks carried out by the licensor will remain ambiguous.
Furthermore, because the performance of licensed products results from a combination of tasks performed by licensor and licensee, licensees will have imperfect understanding of how each task influences performance. Hence, for the licensee, the overall causal determinants that drive the performance of the licensed product will be incompletely specified.
In turn, because of the causal ambiguity, licensing experience will tend to generate superstitious learning and overconfidence. Because licensees face difficulties in correctly attributing the reasons for the performance of the licensed product to their own activities or to contributions from their licensors, overconfidence is likely to be a particularly serious issue.
Several studies suggest that managers often overestimate their own contributions to successful projects (Neale and Bazerman, 1985; Kim and Miner, 2007) . Licensees are likely to overemphasize the value of their own contributions and downplay those of the licensor in the performance of the licensed product, thus driving them to hold unfounded beliefs about their own abilities. As a result, when developing their own independent product, earlier licensees will often attempt to perform actions they are not capable of doing well, based on skills that they do not actually possess. For instance, they may assume erroneously that they have mastered use of particular composite materials and, in turn, may add technical features to their independent product that they are not capable of developing effectively. Overall, they will carry out inadequate actions, causing them to achieve limited independent success.
Hypothesis 1:
Firms that enter a new business domain independently, without prior pre-entry licensing, will achieve greater post-entry performance than the first standalone ventures of firms that initially engaged in pre-entry licensing.
We now consider how the degree of dissimilarity between the context in which licensees accumulated experience and the context in which they undertake new activities will exacerbate the biases from causal ambiguity. Superstitious learning and overconfidence often cause managers to misjudge differences between new and past activities (Tversky, 1977) .
Greater difference between these activities is likely to increase the biases arising from misunderstood experience. Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) demonstrated that novice players out-performed individuals who had played a card game under specific rules when the rules of the game changed. Zollo and Reuer (2010) showed that banks' alliance experience reduced the performance of later acquisitions that required high levels of integration, because alliance experience provided only a limited understanding of integration processes.
Such problems will be particularly common across generations of products because independent entry following licensed production often involves significant dissimilarity. In order to avoid cannibalization or to bypass non-compete agreements, new products often differ significantly in design and market positioning from the prior licensed products.
Differences between licensed products and later independent products tend to be significant in product systems industries such as aircraft manufacturing. Work by Hobday and several co-authors suggests that, in order to meet new customer demands, firms in these industries commonly upgrade their products by adding modules and components to the core architecture of existing products (Miller, Hobday, Leroux-Demers, and Olleros, 1995; Hobday, 1998) . For example, Hobday et al. (2005) report that the number of aircraft gas turbine parts increased from 9,000 in 1946 to 20,000 in 1957. As a consequence of such increased diversity, along with changing technological levels, the level of complexity often increases drastically across generations of products.
Hypothesis 2:
The greater the level of dissimilarity between the initial licensed product and the first independently developed product, the lower the post-entry performance of firms that initially engaged in pre-entry licensing.
In sum, the logic underlying the predictions leads from partial experience via licensing to constraints on later independent activities. Task sharing by licensor and licensee creates causal ambiguity due to organizational separation that impedes the flow of tacit information and creates concerns about intellectual property. In turn, causal ambiguity results in superstitious learning and overconfidence by the licensee. Some of the inferences that licensees draw from their licensing activities are likely to be erroneous, fostering flawed actions for future related projects. Hence, pre-entry licensing can undermine the performance of subsequent autonomous endeavors, such that experience accumulated through product in-licensing may be worse than no experience at all. The problems will be particularly severe when contextual dissimilarity exacerbates biases that arise from the inherent causal ambiguity. The Appendix contains two brief examples of autonomous aircraft projects that struggled despite the focal firm's earlier success with in-licensed aircraft production.
We note that the argument applies most strongly to in-licensing technology for complete products, as opposed to cases in which firms purchase components of product systems that they are developing themselves, such as systems integrators (Hobday, 1998) . Brusoni et al. (2001: 613) indicate that "systems integrator firms outsource detailed design and manufacturing to specialized suppliers while maintaining in-house concept design and systems integration capabilities to coordinate the work (R&D, design, and manufacturing) of suppliers." Entrants that license components must then develop an understanding of relevant causal relationships to integrate them; such cases are less likely to produce overconfidence.
ANALYSIS Data and Method
We tested our predictions on the population of firms that operated in the aircraft industry between 1944 and 2000, examining four business domains of this industry: fighters, turboprops, helicopters, and jets. We drew the data from an extensive archival study, the most important source being the "Jane's All the World's Aircraft" yearbooks for each year from 1944 to 2000. The yearbooks provide technical characteristics and sales information for all aircraft that manufacturers produced each year, as well as the production mode of all aircraft produced in the world (internal development, alliance, or licensing). We considered a firm to have entered one of the four lines of business of the aircraft industry via independent, alliance, or licensing entry based on the firm's first listing in each domain.
Because firms with different characteristics may favor different entry strategies, we used a two-stage model to test the hypotheses (Shaver, 1998) . In the first stage of the model, we used explanatory factors derived from transaction cost and resource-based arguments to predict entry strategies. The second stage analyzed the performance of the businesses that turned to autonomous production, using the inverse Mills ratio from the first-stage analysis to control for the endogeneity of entry strategy choices. We clustered the data by firm in both steps of the analysis; we also clustered by country in the performance models (two-factor clustering is not available for the ordered probit analysis in the first-stage models).
Entry strategy model
The first step of the analysis examined factors driving the choice of entry strategy.
The data include 159 entries by firms based in 27 countries, including 84 first entries into the industry and 75 diversifying entries by aircraft industry incumbents. 2 Firms mainly used independent (93 cases) and licensing (50 cases, from 23 out-licensors) entries. 3 We also found 16 alliance entries in which firms shared design, development, and manufacturing tasks with another firm. We used an ordered Probit regression to examine choices among independent (coded 1), alliance (coded 2), and licensing (coded 3) entry; prior research supports the idea of an ordered entry sequence (Park and Russo, 1996) .
Several firm, project, and environmental factors might influence entry mode choices as well as subsequent performance. Firm Size records a firm's aircraft sales in the year before it entered into the new business domain. Technical Experience records the mean of the technical complexity of all aircraft that the focal firm had previously produced independently in any other domain of the industry; this variable helps assess firms' industry-wide resources.
While the different domains draw upon the same scientific disciplines, they require specific bodies of practice (Pavitt, 1998 ) that limit redeployability. State-owned Firm denoted firms owned by national governments, which may encourage in-licensing to overcome capability constraints and provide subsidies that attract licensors. Product Complexity records the log of the product of the aircraft's maximum speed, range, and takeoff weight (Garrette, Castañer, and Dussauge, 2009) , which helps assess transaction cost and resource-based arguments about complexity (Masten, 1984; Mitchell and Singh, 1996) . Potential Market Size recorded the GDP of each firm's home country in constant U.S. dollars (Maddison, 2003) Four variables served as instruments that might affect entry strategy but do not affect subsequent performance. Bandwagon Effect records the number of autonomously developed products commercialized in the focal business domain, which could increase the pool of potential licensors (Zahra et al., 2005) . Military Design is a dummy variable that controls for national security concerns that might result in military aircraft being more likely to be developed independently. Demand Uncertainty, which may favor internal development (Heide and John, 1990) , records the standard deviation of the firm's home country GDP over the five years prior to project launch; assessing prior demand volatility is a common measure of market uncertainty (Leiblein and Miller, 2003; Robertson and Gatignon, 1998 ). Firm's
Other Aircraft Businesses records the number of businesses that the firm has in the aircraft industry among the fighter, turboprop, jet, and helicopter domains; this variable helps assess transaction cost arguments concerning resource redeployability, although inter-domain differences in knowledge of practice and technology may restrict fungibility (Pavitt, 1998) .
Independent entry success model
The second stage of the model examines the influence of entry strategy on independent performance, while controlling for the endogeneity of entry strategy choices.
The sample includes 113 cases in which firms achieved independent entry in one of the four business domains. Each of these firms independently produced aircraft in the domain, either as their first foothold (93 cases) or after having initially operated through in-licensing (16 cases). We also included four cases in which firms entered independently after undertaking pre-entry alliances. Conceptually, we would expect the impact of alliance entry to fall somewhere between independent and licensing entry because collaboration lies within a continuum that goes from hierarchy to contractual arrangements (Williamson, 1991) ; the 4 For 2000 (when comparable data were available), regressing national GDP against military budget (SIPRI, 2000) and aircraft inventories of airlines based in the country (FI/DMS, 2000) yielded R 2 = 92%.
small number of cases provides exploratory analysis. We treated acquisition entries (12 cases) as continuing operations at the business level. The performance analysis excluded the 46 cases in which firms undertook pre-entry licensing or alliances but did not later develop an independent aircraft of their own; 37 of the 46 firms exited the industry before creating independent operations in the new business domain, while nine were still operating through licensing or alliances at the end of the study period.
6
We measured post-entry success by cumulative Unit Sales of the first independent aircraft in the new domain. Sales volume has long been a key indicator of profitability in the aircraft industry owing to the high level of fixed costs required to initiate a program (Wright, 1936) . To avoid mid-program bias, we estimated unit sales for the 27 aircraft projects for which production had not been terminated by the end of the study period with the yearly production schedule of the 86 programs that reached the end of their production life by 2000. Development Time indicated the marginal development cost of the firm's first independent 6 It is not possible to use a Heckman-type analysis of ultimate independent entry as a first stage in the performance model because firms that chose initial independence by definition also achieve subsequent independence. Separate logit analyses identified three factors that influenced independent entry following alliances or licenses: greater sales of the licensed or alliance product, earlier entry into the domain, and better economic conditions. 7 On average, aircraft projects achieved 6% of their total production at the end of the first year of production, 13% at the end of Year 2, 68% at the end of Year 10, and 86% at the end of Year 15. 8 Technical Complexity Increase has large value when a former licensee introduces an aircraft that is much more complex than the pre-entry licensing aircraft; e.g., when a licensee of Cessna-type aircraft introduces a Hercules-type turboprop. In contrast, low value indicates that the focal autonomous aircraft is less complex than the licensed aircraft; e.g., when a former licensee of a Hercules-type turboprop introduces a Cessna-type aircraft.
project in the new business domain (Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1996) , to address the possibility that licensees may have made investments that they can redeploy toward later independent products and so might launch products with more limited market potential because fewer sales are needed to recoup the marginal investment made when entering independently (although it seems unlikely that firms use pre-entry licensing primarily when they expect to launch later projects with limited market potential). Initial Licensing Success recorded unit sales of the licensed product with which the firm entered in the domain, as a control for firm skills. Licensor Scope recorded the number of domains of the industry in which a licensor operated when it granted a license (the variable was zero for independent entries), to address the possibility that broader-based licensors select licensees they expect will achieve limited independent sales. The Mills Ratio from the first-stage model controls for the endogeneity of entry strategy choices. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics. Table 2 presents the first and second stages of the treatment effect model. Model 1 in The results in Models 2b and 2c of Table 2 support both hypotheses. Consistent with H1, firms that enter a new business domain through initial licensing achieve lower success with their first independent product than firms that immediately opt for independent entry (Model 2b: β = 2.543, p < 0.01). Licensing entry also underperforms the small number of cases that undertook alliance entry (Model 2b: β = 2.382, p < 0.05); alliance entry has a smaller coefficient than independent entry, but the difference is not significant. Consistent with H2, Model 2c indicates that Technical Complexity Increase has a negative impact on the sales of the first independently developed product introduced by former licensees (β = -0.607, p < 0.01); the main effect of licensing entry continues to be negative (β = 3.725, p < 0.01).
RESULTS
Moreover, as we report in the "Payoff" note of Table 2 , the results suggest that firms that chose independent or alliance entry would have achieved lower sales had they chosen licensing, while firms that chose licensing entry would have achieved higher sales had they entered independently or via alliance. The second point is intriguing, because it suggests that many licensing entries are mistakes. Of course, the analysis may omit factors that provided strong barriers to independent or alliance entry, but the core point is that firms need to look hard for avenues to independent or alliance entry before settling for pre-entry licensing.
Several control variables affected performance. Complex products, state-owned firms, and firms with greater sales from their licensed products achieved greater sales of their first independently produced aircraft. Helicopters achieved higher unit sales than the other three types of products. Sales declined with firm size, technical experience, development time, and the number of competitors in the domain. The Mills Ratio was significant.
The results were robust to multiple variations. The "Sensitivity Analyses" footnote to Table 2 summarizes alternative methods, dependent variable, and controls. We also calculated a survival model to ensure that the superior performance of independent entry did not mask a risk of early failure for independent entrants; instead, we found that firms that entered via initial independent entry survived at least as long as pre-entry licensors that later introduced independent products. One might argue that the negative impact of pre-entry licensing could arise from old resources that have become obsolete in the new environment in which the independent products are launched, reflecting competency traps (Leonard-Barton, 1992) rather than superstitious learning and overconfidence. However, the competency-trap argument should also hold for firms that directly entered independently; we found no significant differences when we compared the performance of the first products developed by firms that opted for independent entry to performance of their later independent products.
DISCUSSION
We started by asking whether pre-entry licensees tend to underperform once they undertake independent entry, as a result of superstitious learning and overconfidence produced by the partial learning from in-licensing and ensuing causal ambiguity. The results support this prediction. Firms that used pre-entry licenses achieved lower sales in their subsequent independent ventures than those that immediately undertook independent entry.
Moreover, the penalty increases with greater contextual dissimilarity, consistent with the idea that the change in context exacerbates the detrimental effect of experience involving high levels of causal ambiguity. The study suggests that pre-entry licensees often develop a false sense of confidence that will in turn foster inadequate actions during subsequent independent endeavors. This illusion of knowledge and control causes the firms to trip over unexpected hurdles that may cancel any benefits they derive from previously acquired experience. While licensing may enable firms to enter new domains, it often does not provide them with the resources necessary to successfully compete independently at a later stage.
The study contributes to the markets for technology literature and to the more general literature on organizational learning. Arora et al. (2001) identify the need to determine inefficiencies as well as efficiencies in markets for technology. Yet, the literature on markets for technology has not determined whether in-licensing offers sufficient access to new resources to enhance later independent activities. The experiential learning literature helps us develop logic concerning possible answers to the question. In particular, drawbacks of experience in contexts with high levels of causal ambiguity are relevant when analyzing how in-licensing in the markets for technology will influence the performance of subsequent internally developed initiatives. The work extends research that suggests that technology licensing faces limits in appropriating external knowledge (Mowery et al., 1996) , developing competitive advantage (Steensma and Corley, 2000) , and accumulating experience (Anand and Khanna, 2000) . Strikingly, we show that rather than simply not offering advantages, inlicensing may actually create disadvantages for subsequent independent activity. Thus, we
show that, though firms may choose to in-license technologies to overcome entry barriers, the implication of this choice for long-term performance and survival is not neutral. We uncover an imperfection of the markets for technology by highlighting that in-licensing may undermine the performance of subsequent in-house efforts because it may provide firms with an imperfect understanding of the knowledge critical to the area of business.
In turn, the results suggest that manufacturing complex products often does not provide a clear understanding of the scientific and technological disciplines embodied in the products. Hence, our study extends work that draws upon Pavitt's (1998) distinction between bodies of practice and bodies of understanding to examine systems integrators Prencipe et al., 2003) . Such work argues that integrating modules and components purchased from specialized suppliers does not substitute for creating internal bodies of understanding, so that systems integrators need to "retain a fundamental and integrated understanding of what they outsource" (Brusoni and Principe, 2001: 202) . Our study takes a step further. We suggest that firms that focus on bodies of practice may face difficulties in subsequently developing bodies of understanding because bodies of practice alone can lead firms to develop spurious knowledge about the causal drivers of performance in the domain.
We also contribute to organizational learning research by providing further evidence that attempts to gain experiential learning may hinder performance of later endeavors.
Experiential learning can be misleading when inferences from past actions generate superstitious learning, which will be particularly common when firms gather experience in contexts characterized by high levels of causal ambiguity. In such situations, experience may lead firms to develop a false sense of confidence and to overestimate the extent to which they can solve the challenges they face and, ultimately, to undertake inadequate actions. Our study complements recent work on the performance impact of experience in business activities such as corporate acquisitions. This work suggests that a lack of understanding of the cause-effect relationships in acquisitions is the primary reason for the limited benefits that experience with acquisitions provides (e.g., Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002; Nadolska and Barkema, 2007; Zollo, 2009) . Our study suggests that experience may not only fail to create advantages -for example, for carrying out acquisitions successfully -but may actually create disadvantages for subsequent standalone activities.
The managerial implication of our work is that licensing may provide a jump start in resource creation but can inhibit a firm's ability to develop the new resources it needs to operate effectively. Clearly, firms have incentives to undertake pre-entry licensing despite the problems that the strategy might create. Licensing helps firms gain access to other firms' resources in order to enter a new business domain; nonetheless, such a strategy may inhibit the understanding and control that a firm needs to develop the full suite of resources required for long-term success. By contrast, independent entry forces a firm to develop new resources through its own efforts, leading to greater understanding and control of those resources.
In parallel, the study suggests that incumbents can often safely out-license their products to firms that face barriers to independent entry. In doing so, they gain royalties from their licensees. Further, start-up firms will face substantial hurdles when attempting to unveil high-performance independent products. Outward licensing may thus limit the emergence of strong competitors, as Gallini (1984) argued. Indeed, if licensing is unlikely to result in the emergence of strong competitors, then licensors have a strong incentive to out-license technology. In contrast, should incumbents refuse to out-license their products, start-ups might opt for independent entry and subsequently become stronger competitors. Of course, few of the newcomers may succeed in entering the business domain, but the more successful firms will, in the process, develop the resources required to establish a durable presence.
The study has limitations that suggest avenues for future research. First, we believe that the results generalize to situations in which licensed products are sufficiently complex to generate substantial causal ambiguity; determining boundary conditions will require studying additional industries. Second, it would be useful to investigate cases in which firms do not inlicense whole products but component technologies (e.g., licensees of aircraft engine parts).
Third, while the first stage of the model controls for many factors that influence entry strategy choices, future work could further explore additional factors. Fourth, research could assess superstitious learning and overconfidence more directly.
Overall, the study suggests that pre-entry licensing may help weaker firms overcome entry barriers, but can undermine subsequent independent performance when causal ambiguity is present. This supports the idea that partial experience via in-licensing can generate superstitious learning and overconfidence that constrain firms' future independent activities. Thus, experience does not substitute for careful independent development of resources that firms need to operate in dynamic environments. Notes a. Model 1 (159 entries): Ordered probit clustered by firm (84); Entry Strategy is coded 1 for independent, 2 for alliance, and 3 for licensing (positive = more likely to license). This model controls for firm skills and other factors that might affect subsequent performance in the unit sales models. The instruments from Model 1 (bandwagon effect and military design) had no impact on performance when added to Model 2.
b. Model 2 (113 entries):
OLS clustered by firm (70) and country (19) to address firm-level commonalities across business domains and common national policies (two-factor clustering is not available for ordered probit); Unit Sales records cumulative sales of the first independent project (positive = greater sales) c. Payoffs: We used the coefficients of Model 2c to calculate the performance that firms would have achieved had they used an alternative entry strategy. Firms that chose independent or alliance entry would have achieved lower sales had they chosen licensing entry (Production = 912 for independent or alliance entry vs. 663 for licensing entry) and that firms that chose licensing entry would have achieved higher sales had they entered through an independent or alliance entry (Production = 240 for licensing entry vs. 870 for independent or alliance entry).
d. Sensitivity analyses:
The results are robust to alternative methods (GLS and random effects regression); performance based on the sales value of the first autonomously developed product (we used price estimations specified in the Aerospace Systems Group Library (FI/DMS, 2000); increased technical complexity based on the least complex licensed product or using ratios rather than differences in complexity; adding controls for military budgets, economic climate, elapsed time between license and independent entry, number of in-licenses, and number of competing products; assessing survival of independent entrants; and comparing the performance of first and second independent entries.
aircraft by the end of production in 1986. After the U. 
